The End of Iraq (3)

By Peter Galbraith
The End of Iraq - part 1
The End of Iraq - part 2

Tuwaitha is a sprawling complex south of Baghdad where Iraq once did its research into nuclear power and nuclear weapons. After the first Gulf War, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervised the destruction of some of the nuclear-related materials at Tuwaitha while making a careful inventory of other materials that were then se­cured with IAEA seals. Among the IAEA-monitored materials at the complex were barrels containing "yellowcake;' unprocessed uranium that, when enriched, is the fissile material for a nuclear bomb. Tuwaitha and its contents were well known to American intelligence. But, in case U.S. officials failed to appreciate the potential dangers at Tuwaitha, IAEA Director General Mohamed EIBaradei personally told American diplomats in Vienna on April 1 0,2003, of the "need to secure the nuclear material stored at Tuwaitha:'
When U.S. troops arrived at Tuwaitha, the yellowcake was in a locked warehouse that had been secured by the IAEA before the in­spectors left at the start of the war. While U.S. troops were actually at Tuwaitha, looters broke into the warehouse. They took the barrels and apparently dumped the yellowcake. Almost two tons went missing. In his 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush said Iraq's efforts to acquire yellowcake from Niger were so dangerous that they justified a war, even though the intelligence about Iraq's Niger connection was transparently fraudulent. Yet his Administration did not consider Iraq's actual stockpile of yellowcake important enough to justify or­dering U.S. troops at the location to protect it.
The End of Iraq, page 103.


In early April, U.S. troops had arrived at al-Qaqaa, a large facility thirty miles south of Baghdad. The bunkers at the complex contained194 metric tons of High Melting Point Explosive (HMX) and 141 met­ric tons of Rapid Detonation Explosive (RDX). High explosives, like RDX and HMX, are used to implode a uranium or plutonium sphere and thus trigger a chain reaction leading to a nuclear explosion. "Fat Boy," the plutonium bomb dropped on Nagasaki in 1945, used one ton of high explosives. While Iraq acquired RDX and HMX for its nuclear program in the 1980s, the explosives are also used for construction and other civilian purposes. Rather than destroy these stockpiles, the IAEA monitored them in the 1990s. After Iraq agreed to resume inspections in 2002, EIBaradei ordered his inspectors back to al-Qaqaa, and re­ported to the Security Council in January 2003 on the stockpiles' status. Immediately after Saddam's fall, the IAEA expressed its concern about the physical security of the explosives to U.S. diplomats at its Vienna headquarters.
In spite of these warnings, U.S. troops left the al-Qaqaa bunkers un­guarded. In the months that followed, looters removed the RDX, the HMX, and 5.8 metric tons of PETN, a third explosive. This was no small operation. Removing so much material would have required at least forty ten-ton trucks.
The End of Iraq, page 104.

Over the three weeks I was in Iraq, I went unchallenged into many important Iraqi buildings and facilities. These included the Foreign Ministry, the Trade Ministry, the former Royal Palace, the Iraqi Olympic Committee headquarters, Mosul University, Uday Hussein's house, prisons, arms depots, and intelligence facilities. Looters were at work in every building I visited...
Many of the sites I visited had obvious intelligence value, and there were many more American troops in Baghdad than ABC journalists. Yet neither the Pentagon nor the CIA seems to have made any effort to mine these sites for intelligence.
The End of Iraq, page 111-112.

Rumsfeld on looting in Iraq: 'Stuff happens'

Rumsfeld did think the Oil Ministry was important, and as I passed it on April IS, I saw an American tank and a handful of troops sta­tioned in its walled compound. Nearby, the Ministry of Irrigation burned, destroying the plans and blueprints for Iraq's dams, barrages, pumping stations, and thousands of kilometers of canals. The implica­tions were obvious. Oil was a priority, but the water on which millions of Iraqis depended was not. Many Iraqis had the same thought.
The End of Iraq, page 113.

To be continued...
Pictures and titles in this article are not from the book "The End of Iraq".