The End of Iraq (5)

By Peter Galbraith
Americans Incompetence - part 1

Americans Incompetence (2)

Although President Bush proclaimed America's mission was to bring the blessings of freedom to the Iraqi people, his administration was reluctant to trust them with democracy.
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Specifically, the Administration proposed to limit the choices of the peoples of Iraq by having the country's permanent constitution writ­ten by Iraqis selected by the Americans. The hand-picked Iraqis would then be assisted by American constitutional advisors who would en­sure that the constitution included Western-style human rights pro­tections, incorporated a system of checks and balances, preserved the unity of the country, centralized control of oil, and promoted eco­nomic and social policies liked by American conservatives. The constitution would be submitted to the Iraqi peoples in a referendum. They would then be faced with the choice of either accepting the constitu­tion and regaining sovereignty, or rejecting it and having a prolonged
occupation. The scheme reflected the extraordinary ambitions of the Administration's neoconservative would-be nation-builders who wanted to leave their ideological imprint on Iraq. It was also undemocratic.

Highest Religious Authority and the Leader of the Hawza (Najaf)

In 2003, the most influential man in Iraq turned out not to be the American viceroy, Jerry Bremer, but a frail seventy-three-year-old Shi­ite cleric who lived in a modest house near the shrine of Ali in Najaf. An Iranian by birth and citizenship, the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani was determined that the Bush Administration not prevent Iraq's Shiite reli­gious leaders from creating an Islamic state if, as Sistani knew full well they would, their voters wanted one.
Sistani adopted a straightforward position: Iraq's constitution should be written by elected Iraqis and, as a corollary, the United States should transfer power to an elected government, not an appointed one. He wanted elections held as soon as possible, but not later than 2004 and with the occupation ending immediately afterward.
Bremer came up with one strategy after another to avoid meeting Sistani's demand. As a result, the Iranian cleric became the champion of Iraqi democracy while the American administrator appeared un­willing to trust the Iraqi people. To make matters worse for the Ameri­cans, Sistani won every battle with Bremer. Bremer and the Bush Administration came across not only as undemocratic but also as weak.
The End of Iraq, page 136-137.

To be continued...
Pictures and titles in this article are not from the book "The End of Iraq".